In June 2010, the Japanese cabinet adopted a new Basic Energy Plan (BEP). This was the third such plan that the government has approved since the passage of the Basic Act on Energy Policy in 2002, and it represents the most significant statement of Japanese energy policy in more than four years, since the publication of the New National Energy Strategy (NNES) in 2006. Perhaps more than its predecessors, moreover, the new plan establishes a number of ambitious targets as well as more detailed measures for achieving those targets. Among the targets are a doubling of Japan's "energy independence ratio," a doubling of the percentage of electricity generated by renewable sources and nuclear power, and a 30 percent reduction in energy-related CO2 emissions, all by 2030. This paper explains the origins of the 2010 BEP and why it was adopted. It then describes the content of the plan and how it differs from the NNES. A third section analyzes the appropriateness of the new goals and targets contained in the BEP and their feasibility, finding that achievement of many of the targets was likely to be quite challenging even before the March 2011 earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear crisis.
Introduction
In June 2010, the Japanese cabinet adopted a new Basic Energy Plan (BEP). This was the third such plan that the government has approved since the passage of the Basic Act on Energy Policy in 2002, and it represents the most significant statement of Japanese energy policy in more than four years, since the publication of the New National Energy Strategy (NNES) in 2006.
1 Perhaps more than its predecessors, moreover, the new plan establishes a number of ambitious targets as well as more detailed measures for achieving those targets. Among the targets are a doubling of Japan's "energy independence ratio," a doubling of the percentage of electricity generated by renewable sources and nuclear power, and a 30 percent reduction in energy-related CO2 emissions, all by 2030. This paper explains the origins of the 2010 BEP and why it was adopted. It then describes the content of the plan and how it differs from the NNES. A third section analyzes the appropriateness of the new goals and targets contained in the BEP and their feasibility. It finds that achievement of many of the targets is likely to be quite challenging, all the more so in the aftermath of the March 2011 earthquake, tsunami, and crisis at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant.
Background
For most of the postwar era, Japan lacked an overarching energy plan or strategy.
Beginning in 1967, the government published every two to five years a Long-Term Energy Supply and Demand Outlook (Choki enerugii jukyu mitoshi), which forecast such important indices as energy demand by sector, primary energy supply by fuel, and, in more recent years, energy-derived CO2 emissions based on different sets of assumptions about the policies likely to be in place (IEA 5 The Basic Act begins with a short statement of purpose:
Energy is essential to the maintenance and development of the national economy and enhancing the stability of peoples' lives. Moreover, inasmuch as energy has a major impact on the local and global environments, it is necessary to promote measures concerning supply and demand and to clarify the responsibilities of national and local governments.
Establishing measures to ensure long-term, comprehensive, and planned policies for that supply and demand will contribute to the development of the national and world economies, while contributing to the preservation of the national and global environment (Basic Act on Energy Policy, 14 June 2002, Law No. 71 ; translation by the authors).
The Basic Act then establishes three general goals of energy policy: securing a stable supply of energy, ensuring environmental sustainability, and utilizing market mechanisms (see also IEA 2008, 29) . The act also defines the roles and obligations of all the key actors and stakeholders: the central government, local governments, businesses, and the general public.
The Basic Act provides no specifics about energy policy, however. Instead, for that purpose, it requires the government to formulate a basic plan to promote energy supply and demand measures on a long-term, comprehensive, and systematic basis. The government is supposed to review the basic energy plan at least every three years and revise it as necessary in light of changing circumstances and the effectiveness of existing policies. The Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) was tasked with formulating the draft basic energy plan and then seeking cabinet approval before reporting it to the Diet. 5 The first Basic Energy Plan (Enerugi kihon keikaku or BEP) was duly developed and adopted in October 2003. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), its key points were to promote nuclear power generation, to enhance efforts to secure a stable oil supply, and to lead the formulation of an effective international framework for enhancing energy conservation and coping with climate change (IEA 2008, 29) . A revision of the BEP was prepared in late 2006 and adopted by the cabinet in early 2007, but it was based on and largely overshadowed by another energy policy statement, the New National Energy Strategy (Shin-kokka enerugii senryaku or NNES), which was issued by METI in May 2006 (IEA 2008, 59 ).
In contrast to the BEP, the NNES did not receive broader government approval, but it figured prominently in subsequent energy policy discussions. The NNES was developed in response to renewed concerns about Japan's energy security due, in particular, to rising oil prices, a revival of resource nationalism among foreign energy suppliers, and growing regional competition and conflict over energy resources (ESSG 2006; Christoffels 2007) . Thus, in contrast to the Basic Act, the NNES placed primary emphasis on and sought to bring greater attention to the issue of energy security. To promote Japan's energy security, the NNES established ambitious numerical targets to be attained by 2030 (see below), and it went on to elaborate eight specific programs across a wide range of actions for implementing the strategy (METI 2006a, 14) .
During the following years, however, more of a balance was restored in Japanese energy policy. Concerns about security of supply abated somewhat, despite a continued rise in oil prices, while concerns about environmental sustainability, especially climate change, returned to the fore.
In May 2007, then Prime Minister Shinzo Abe announced an initiative, "Cool Earth 50," to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in Japan and globally in the short-, medium-, and long-term. 6 In July 2008, the cabinet adopted a detailed "Action Plan for Achieving a Low-carbon Society. To achieve these goals, the BEP establishes five ambitious targets for 2030. The first target is to double Japan's "energy self-sufficiency ratio" (currently 18 percent) to about 40 percent and its "self-developed fossil fuel supply ratio" (currently 26 percent) to about 50 percent, and, as a result, to raise its "energy independence ratio" (currently 38 percent) to about 70 percent. The latter figure is currently the average among the members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
The energy self-sufficiency (ESF) ratio is the percentage of Japan's primary energy supply that is produced domestically and consists primarily of renewable energy sources and nuclear power, since Japan produces only very small amounts of coal, natural gas, crude oil, and liquified petroleum gases (LPG). The self-developed fossil fuel supply (SFFS) ratio is the percentage of imported coal, natural gas, oil, and LPG that is produced by Japanese companies. The energy independence (EI) ratio is the percentage of Japan's primary energy supply that consists of either energy produced domestically or imported fossil fuels that are produced by Japanese companies. It can be calculated approximately as follows:
To achieve this target, Japan would bring about a substantial change in its energy mix. The shares attributable to renewable energy sources and nuclear power would more than double.
Renewables would increase from six percent (in 2007) to 13 percent while nuclear power would increase from 10 percent to 24 percent. Meanwhile, the shares of most fossil fuels would decrease.
Natural gas would decline from 18 to 16 percent, coal from 22 to 17 percent, and petroleum from 41 to 28 percent. Only LPG's small share of three percent would remain constant.
In absolute terms, Japan's primary energy supply would decline by 13 percent, from 592 million kiloliters (mkL) of oil equivalent to 514 mkL. The amount of natural gas, coal, and petroleum consumed would decline by 24 percent, 35 percent, and 42 percent, respectively. In contrast, consumption of renewable and nuclear energy would increase by 91 percent and 103 percent, respectively. The second and related target is to raise the "zero-emission power supply ratio" from the current 34 percent to 70 percent. The zero-emission power supply ratio concerns the percentage of electric power that is generated by sources that produce little or no CO2. To achieve this goal, Japan will have to increase substantially the amount of electricity provided by nuclear power and renewable sources, especially "new" sources such as wind, solar, and biomass, because the country's hydroelectric potential has already been largely exploited (IEA 2008, 122) . According to the BEP, the shares attributable to renewable and nuclear power will more than double. For renewables, this will mean going from eight percent to 19 percent of electricity generated. For nuclear, from 26 percent to more than 50 percent.
In turn, Japan will have to increase substantially its renewable energy and nuclear power generating capacity. Installed renewable energy capacity would have to rise from 50 gigawatts (GW) to 117.5 GW, an increase of more than 130 percent, and most of this increase would have to come from new sources other than hydropower, which has traditionally been the largest source of renewable electricity and currently provides most of the renewable generating capacity (IEA 2008, 150; EDMC 2010, 187 and 207) . The remaining three targets can be stated much more briefly. One is to halve the CO2 emissions of the residential sector. Another is to maintain and enhance the energy efficiency of the industrial sector. The final target is to maintain or obtain "top-class" shares of global markets for energy-related products and systems.
If these targets are reached, Japan would achieve a significant 30 percent reduction in its The second category consists of measures to create an independent and environmentally-friendly energy supply structure. This category includes measures to expand the introduction of renewable energy sources, to promote nuclear power generation, and to achieve advanced utilization of fossil fuels, especially coal.
To increase the use of renewable energy, the government would expand the recently introduced feed-in tariff system, which currently applies only to small-scale electricity generation by photovoltaic (PV) cells, to include wind, geothermal, biomass, and small-to medium-scale hydroelectric plants. The government would increase its support for the introduction of new renewable technologies, through such means as tax reductions, subsidies, and support for research and development. And it would take steps to deregulate the domestic energy market and prepare the power grid for intermittent sources of supply. Other measures that were considered by METI include introducing sustainability standards for biofuels and expanding the introduction of renewable thermal energy.
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To promote nuclear power generation, the government would seek to extend the time between routine power plant inspections and to shorten shutdowns during inspections. 16 It would improve the "power source location" subsidy system, which it uses to gain acceptance by local authorities and communities for nuclear power facilities. And it would take steps toward the establishment of the complete nuclear fuel cycle, including the development of "pluthermal" light-water reactors, which can use plutonium fuel, and fast breeder reactors.
Regarding the final set of supply-related measures, the BEP recognizes that Japan will still have to rely to a substantial extent on coal, which produces the most CO2 per unit of energy. But the government would take several steps to reduce CO2 emissions from coal. It would promote the commercialization of new, more efficient coal burning technologies, such as integrated gasification combined cycle (IGCC), and require that all new coal plants achieve emissions levels comparable to IGCC. It would also accelerate the development and commercialization of technology for carbon capture and storage (CCS) technologies and require that new coal plants be CCS-ready and then be equipped with CCS technology as soon as it became available.
The third category consists of measures for "realizing a low carbon energy demand structure." These are divided into the traditional energy-consuming sectors -industrial, transportation, residential, and commercial -as well as cross-sectoral efforts.
To reduce carbon emissions in the industrial sector, the government would promote the substitution of natural gas for coal and petroleum. It would enforce more stringently the Energy Conservation Law (Sho enerugii ho). And, although Japanese industry already leads the world in energy efficiency, the government would promote the maximum introduction of state of the art technologies for increasing energy efficiency yet further (see also IEEJ 2010a, 3). Assuming no increase in steel production, which is a major source of Japanese CO2 emissions, the BEP anticipates that the industrial sector could achieve a 25 percent reduction in CO2 emissions by 2030.
To reduce CO2 emissions in the transportation sector, the government would mobilize all Other specific measures contained in the BEP concern building next-generation energy and social systems, expanding the use of innovative energy technologies, promoting international energy and environmental cooperation, reforming the structure of the energy industry, and promoting public understanding and human resource training. They include achieving the smart grid and smart communities, promoting the development and installation of smart meters and other energy management systems, diffusing fuel cells and developing a hydrogen supply infrastructure, and accelerating the development and dissemination of innovative energy technologies.
Analysis
The adoption of a new BEP raises at least several questions. How has Japanese energy policy changed? How appropriate are the new targets? What challenges do they face, and how likely is it that the new targets will be realized?
Changes in the Goals and Targets of Japanese Energy Policy
In terms of the basic goals it establishes, the new BEP offers considerable continuity with previous statements of Japanese energy policy. It maintains the traditional goals, the so-called "3 E's": energy security, environmental sustainability, and economic efficiency. In addition, it reiterates two other goals that have been associated with Japan's controversial nuclear power program: safety and public understanding.
In several other important respects, however, the BEP represents a departure from past policy. It includes for the first time two other goals. One is the use of energy policy to promote more general economic growth. The other is the need to restructure the energy industry. In addition, the BEP places much more emphasis on fighting climate change than did the NNES, which was primarily concerned with energy security. Indeed, if one is to judge the BEP by the summary published on the METI website, one might easily reach the conclusion that the most important objective of Japanese policy is to reduce energy-related carbon emissions. It is likely that this apparent obsession is in response to former prime minister Hatoyama's 2009 pledge to reduce Japan's greenhouse gas emissions substantially by 2020.
The BEP also offers significant changes in the key targets of Japanese energy policy. Like One can readily detect a number of differences between the NNES and the BEP in this regard, however. One is a shift in emphasis from improving energy efficiency, which was the first target of the NNES, to reducing energy-related carbon emissions. Obviously, these two goals are related, but they are not identical. Related to this change is increased emphasis on the residential sector, reflecting the fact that CO2 emissions in the residential and commercial sectors have grown by nearly 50 percent since 1990 while those from transportation and industry have declined over the past decade.
A second difference is a shift in the conceptualization of energy security and independence.
The NNES was focused primarily on oil, which figured in three of the five targets. In contrast, the 2010 BEP employs broader measures: an overall measure of energy-self sufficiency and a comprehensive measure of the share of all fossil fuels that are supplied by Japanese companies. It also offers a new measure of overall energy independence that combines the two other ratios.
Third, the BEP contains much more ambitious and detailed targets for nuclear power. The new target represents an increase in the share of nuclear generated electricity of at least [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] percent over that contained in the NNES. In addition, and in contrast to the NNES and its associated "Nuclear Energy National Plan" (METI 2006b), the BEP contains very specific figures for the number of new nuclear power plants to be built and the level of capacity utilization to be attained.
Fourth, the BEP likewise contains more ambitious and detailed targets for renewable sources of energy. In fact, the NNES contained no specific targets for renewable energy. Because of growing concerns about climate change, the government had subsequently (by 2009) established a goal of increasing the share of renewable energy in the primary energy supply from six percent (2005) to 9.0 percent in 2020 and 11.6 percent in 2030. 17 But the BEP raises these targets even higher, to 13 percent. According to one government estimate, a comprehensive feed-in tariff could increase electricity production from new sources by 40 to 50 billion kilowatt hours (kWh) or more (roughly four to five percent of Japan's current output) in 10 years. 18 But as of early 2011, the comprehensive feed-in tariff had not yet been introduced (IEEJ 2011), and presumably additional measures would still be required if the targets contained in the BEP are to be achieved.
Finally, the BEP contains a completely new type of target -concerning the global market shares of Japanese energy companies -that reflects the new emphasis on economic growth and industry restructuring contained in the plan.
Appropriateness: Are These the Right Goals and Targets?
One question that can be immediately raised about some of the goals and targets contained in the BEP concerns their suitability. Two in particular merit scrutiny. One is the reconceptualization of energy security and independence. In particular, the introduction of the concept of the self-developed fossil fuel supply may obscure important differences in the markets for oil, natural gas, and coal and Japan's corresponding vulnerabilities. Until now, Japan's principal concern has been with access to oil, and the government has been trying to raise the level of so-called "equity oil" (oil produced by Japanese companies) since the 1970s, although without Traditionally, moreover, Japan has worried most about the security of its foreign oil supplies. To be sure, its imports of natural gas have not been immune to disruption; in 2001, an important LNG plant in Indonesia, which provided about 30 percent of Japan's LNG imports at the time, was closed for seven months because of political unrest (IEA 2002, 78) . But nearly 90 percent of Japan's oil comes from the Middle East and must pass through vulnerable choke points (EMDC 2010, 154 ; interview with METI officials, Tokyo, May 26, 2010). Japan's particular vulnerability to disruptions in foreign oil supplies will be less of an issue as its overall oil consumption and the oil dependence of the transportation sector decline, but it will not go away completely.
Another issue concerns the focus on improving energy efficiency in the industrial sector.
There may be significant efficiency gains to be made, but the industrial sector may not be the best place to look for them. To be sure, industry remains the largest energy consumer, at 46 percent in 2008 (EDMC 2010, 38) . But it has also been the principal target of government efforts to increase energy efficiency since the 1970s --approximately 90 percent of the energy consumption in the sector has long been covered by the Energy Conservation Law and, partly as a result, the share of energy consumption attributable to the industrial sector has steadily declined, from nearly two-thirds in 1973 (EMDC 2010, 38; ECCJ 2009, 3) . 19 Thus most of the easy savings in industry have already been exploited (see also Niquet 2007, 8) .
Feasibility
The other question that might be raised concerns the feasibility of the new BEP. What are the prospects for achieving the ambitious targets it sets forth? This question is necessarily more difficult to answer with any certainty. Much can change over the next 20 years, and the BEP is likely to be revised multiple times accordingly. In addition, the achievement of several of the targets will be sensitive to progress in attaining other targets. At a minimum, however, one can say that attainment of the targets is likely to be challenging, especially given the deep-seated doubts concerning the future of Japan's reliance on nuclear power brought to the fore by the March 2011 earthquake and tsunami that severely damaged the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant and released radioactive elements into the environment.
Let us start with the issue of achieving a much higher level of energy independence, as defined by the "energy independence ratio." Much will depend on how rapidly Japan is able to raise the production of electricity (and heat) from renewable sources and nuclear power and reduce the overall level of energy consumption. The lower the level of energy consumption and the higher the level of domestic energy production, the less fossil fuel Japan will have to import and the easier it will be to raise the self-developed fossil fuel supply (SFFS) ratio.
According to the figures supplied by METI, Japan consumed 497 mkL of oil equivalent in fossil fuels in 2007, while Japanese companies produced the equivalent of 26 percent of that amount, or 129 mkL of oil equivalent. METI projects that Japanese fossil fuel consumption will decline to 325 mkL in 2030. In that case, Japanese companies would have to produce 162 mkL to achieve the target of a 50 percent SFFS ratio, or an increase of just 33 mkL (25 percent) over the 2007 level. That may be a feasible figure, although, as noted above, Japanese oil companies have not been very successful in increasing the amount of oil they produce over the years. And, needless to say, if the reduction in fossil fuel consumption falls short of that projection, the challenge for Japanese companies will be that much greater.
A second issue concerns the feasibility of substantially reducing energy-related CO2
emissions. There certainly would seem to be considerable potential for doing so, especially in the residential and commercial sectors, which have seen significant increases in emissions since 1990
despite the overall stagnation of the Japanese economy. But the achievement of this goal, too, will depend on how quickly ever greater levels of renewable and nuclear energy can be introduced (more on this below). And the recent history of independent efforts to reduce greenhouse gas The legislation that it introduced the following March on "global warming countermeasures,"
however, faced strong opposition from the business community and remained unfinished in July 2010, when the DPJ suffered losses in the upper house elections, putting the ultimate fate of the legislation in doubt (IEEJ 2010b, 8) . 20 Closely related is the goal of making improvements in energy efficiency, especially in the industrial sector. Here the difficulty lies in the fact that Japan's overall energy efficiency, as defined by the ratio of primary energy consumption (PEC) over GDP, is already the world's lowest, and is even significantly lower -by approximately 50 percent --than that of the EU or the United States (Masaki 2006) . 21 Yet most of the drop in Japan's energy intensity occurred by the mid-1980s. In fact, between 1990 and 2005, it declined by less than three percent (EDMC 2010, 32) . Thus it appears that many of the easiest gains have already been made, and the particular challenges of increasing energy efficiency in the industrial sector have been noted above.
Turning now to the supply side, the central issue, which has been raised already, is the potential to expand the amount of energy provided by renewable sources and nuclear power. 
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A different set of problems is likely to limit the potential for the introduction of biofuels, even at the modest target of three percent of the gasoline supply. In recent years, concern about the environmental sustainability of biofuels production has grown (e.g., EPA 2009). If the goal is to reduce CO2 emissions by 50 percent in comparison with gasoline, then that leaves few potential sources of supply, given current technologies. According to one government estimate, the domestic supply of biofuels could be increased to only 400,000 kiloliter crude oil equivalent (COE, or about 0.343 MTOE) (IEEJ 2010a, 7), which would amount to less than 0.5 percent of current domestic demand. At the same time, the potential for expanding environmentally sustainable imports from Brazil, the world's largest biofuels exporter, is limited to about 200,000 kiloliter COE (about 0.172 MTOE) (IEEJ 2010a, 7) .
For all these reasons, METI predicted in 2009 that the share of the primary energy supply provided by renewables in 2030 would reach only 11.6 percent, less than the 13 percent called for in the BEP, even with "maximum introduction of technology." 26 And as challenging as achieving the targets for renewable energy may be, even more controversy is likely to attend the targets for nuclear power. Here, two distinct issues are involved: increasing the amount of electricity generating capacity, chiefly by building more power plants, and raising the capacity utilization (utility factor) of the nuclear power plants. In both cases, at least the short-to medium-term outlook is not encouraging. Indeed, one nuclear industry expert admitted in an interview, "no one thinks they will be achievable" (interview with non-governmental experts, Tokyo, May 25, 2010].
As noted above, the BEP calls for the construction of at least 14 more nuclear reactors by 2030, with a combined capacity of 18 GW, assuming none of the 54 existing reactors is decommissioned in the meantime. The construction of new reactors has slowed greatly in the last decade, however, because of safety concerns and local opposition, and the crisis caused by the March 2011 earthquake and tsunami at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, which will result in the loss of at least four reactors with a combined generating capacity of 2.8 GW, is likely to greatly compound those concerns. A major reason behind the waning enthusiasm for new nuclear power plant construction derives from the anxieties generated by a series of mishaps (IEA 2003, 105-106) . Until the crisis at the Fukushima Daiichi plant, the most notorious of these were a 1981 incident in which nearly 300 workers were exposed to dangerous levels of radiation after a fuel rod ruptured at the Tsuruga nuclear power plant and the death of five workers in 2004 as a result of a steam explosion at the Mihama-3 station. A subsequent investigation into the causes of the Mihama incident revealed serious deficiencies in the inspection procedures for nuclear facilities that led to a through reconsideration of policy (Buckley 2006) . The anxiety generated by these mishaps is magnified by the citizenry's "nuclear allergy" as a result of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (Berger 1998) , and the fact that earthquakes frequently rattle the Japanese Increasing capacity utilization is not likely to be much easier. From the mid-1990s to the early 2000s, nuclear capacity utilization in Japan hovered around 80 percent, and during the past five years, it has been consistently below 70 percent and fallen as low as 58 percent. In contrast, the nuclear utility factor in the United States, South Korea, and Finland has fluctuated between 90 and 95 percent in recent years (Nagatomi et al. 2010) . The reasons for the relatively low utility factor in Japan include shorter operational cycles between routine inspections and maintenance, longer outage times for maintenance and repairs, and extensive unplanned outages due to accidents, including a 2007 earthquake that shut down seven reactors, and other safety concerns Finally, we must consider the general level of support likely to be had by the BEP. To be implemented, it will require the cooperation of industry and the general public. Here, too, however, there are grounds for concern, which were raised in the discussions of the METI energy advisory committee prior to the BEP's adoption. At least one member expressed the view that since the government is planning to tighten regulations to a substantial extent, it is questionable whether industry would agree to go along with the plan (IEEJ 2010b, 7) . And another committee member reportedly commented that consumers may not be able to afford many of the innovations required to achieve the targets of the plan, such as zero-emission houses, high efficiency water heaters, and next-generation automobiles (IEEJ 2010a, 4).
Such reservations, especially those of industry, are likely to carry considerable weight.
Traditionally, energy policy has been the purview of METI, which has close ties to the business community. Among METI's chief private-sector allies are the ten regional utility monopolies (e.g., Tokyo Electric Power Company and Nippon Keidanren, the umbrella organization for major corporations and nation-wide industrial federations. It is common for METI bureaucrats -as well as other government officials -to retire from the government service and "descend from heaven"
(amakudari) into "second careers" with private-or quasi-governmental companies. Policy proposals typically originate in "deliberative councils" (shingikai) organized under a particular ministry with members drawn from the private sector, think tanks, academia, and the mass media.
Not surprisingly, it is rare that a council proposes policies that are not supported by the parent ministry.
In more recent years, METI has had to compete within the bureaucracy with the Ministry of Environment (MOE) to shape government policy and strategy (Lam 2009 ), but the playing field remains tilted in METI's favor. Although the MOE's position has been backed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which enjoys championing the Kyoto Protocol and other global causes, as well as environmental groups such as Eco-Japan, METI is universally regarded as one of the country's elite economic ministries (Johnson 1982) , while the MOE did not achieve full ministerial status until 2001. Also, the deep-pocketed regional utility monopolies and industrial energy users have cultivated salubrious ties with influential politicians through generous campaign contributions that far outpace the resources available to environmental groups.
Conclusion
Japan is to be commended for having such a systematic and comprehensive energy planning process. None of the other major advanced industrialized countries produces a comprehensive national energy plan on such a regular basis. The Japanese government is also to be commended for taking the issues of energy security and climate change so seriously. And government leaders such as former prime minister Hatoyama are to be commended for having the courage to pledge significant cuts in energy-related carbon emissions.
Nevertheless, the 2010 BEP, like the NNES before it, is a highly ambitious document. It sets very challenging targets for 2030. Being ambitious is not in and of itself to be faulted, but it does raise the potential for provoking negative reactions by affected parties and, ultimately, a disappointing gap between its aspirations and achievements. For example, a number of knowledgeable insiders believe that Hatoyama's pledge to cut energy-related carbon emissions by 25 percent by 2020 is unattainable. 28 Indeed, at the United Nations Climate Change Conference held in Cancún in late 2010, the Japanese government reversed its stance and indicated its opposition to extending the Kyoto protocol. The likely impetus for this policy flip-flop was the desire to avoid disadvantaging Japan vis-à-vis countries such as China and India that are not bound to make similar carbon emissions cuts (Vidal 2010) .
Compounding the inherent difficulty of achieving the targets set by the BEP is the fact that the Japanese political scene remains highly unsettled. Japan has had five prime ministers since the announcement of the 2006 Basic Energy Plan. It also saw the most decisive shift in electoral fortunes in decades in 2009, when the DPJ unseated the long-ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). But the DPJ itself lost its hold on one of the two houses of the Diet as a result of the July 2010 elections. With a "twisted parliament," in which the DPJ controls the Diet's lower house but not its upper house, it is likely that Japan will face a prolonged period of political gridlock. And there is the additional problem of the DPJ's lack of policymaking expertise as a result of the many years it spent in opposition while the LDP wielded a virtual monopoly on parliamentary power.
The economic setting is no more auspicious. For the past two decades, after the collapse of the Japanese bubble economy, real GDP per capita has grown at a rate of less than one percent per year. Given the current depressed state of the world economy, a rapid economic recovery is not likely to be in the cards. It is important to recall that it was the oil shocks of 1973 and 1979 that brought down the curtain on Japan's postwar economic boom, which was characterized by double-digit annual rates of growth. In response, the government enacted energy conservation measures which are among the most stringent in the industrialized world, leading some to dub Japan a "superpower" in energy efficiency (Stewart and Wilczewski 2009) . Thus the resources needed to pay for significant changes in the energy supply and demand structures as well as energy industry are likely to be hard to come by. And, at the very least, the massive damage inflicted by
March 2011 earthquake and tsunami will prompt soul-searching about the future of nuclear power as a component of Japan's overall energy policy.
Nevertheless, 20 years is a long time in policy circles. Much could happen between now and 2030, the target year for the achievement of the goals contained in the BEP. Thus it is far too soon to pronounce the new BEP unachievable.
